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Matter is not Soul; it is not Intellect, is not Life, is no Ideal-Principle, no Reason-Principle; it is not limit or bound, for it is mere indetermination; it is not a power, for what does it produce?  
–Luce Irigaray​[1]​

...And yet beneath 
The stillness of everything gone, and being still, 





Since the late 1990s a shift has begun to take place in feminist thought, and critical theory more generally, which sees increasing attention paid to questions concerning the materiality of bodies and nature as that which is more than a passive medium for the determinations of social forces.  For sure, the appeal to the discursive, by Anglophone feminists drawing on postmodern and poststructuralist philosophies, exposed the extent to which language and culture are implicated in power and politics, and thus actively work to establish and buttress social norms regarding gender (as well as a whole range of identificatory categories such as race, class and sexuality).  However, in recent years a growing number of feminists have expressed concern that the intense preoccupation with social constructivism typical of postmodern and poststructural feminism has fuelled a certain wariness, even antipathy, towards matter and materiality as that which exceeds socio-cultural discourse.​[3]​  Although ‘the body’ has been a signature topic in feminist writings since the publication of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex in 1949, it may be argued that feminist theory tends to examine discourse about the body rather than the material reality of bodies and corporeal practices.​[4]​  In particular, Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter are often cited as paradigmatic examples of the eclipse of matter in feminist theorizing in favour of what could be called ‘linguistic idealism’.​[5]​  Seeking to reclaim matter to feminist theory is a growing group of feminist scholars whose work, often informed by the physical and biological sciences, is helping to drive a materialist turn in theory more generally, a turn which has been gathering momentum and is variously dubbed ‘new materialism’,​[6]​ ‘post-constructionism’,​[7]​ ‘transcorporeal feminism’,​[8]​ or ‘material feminism’.​[9]​ 

Later I will highlight what we might think of as the main nodal points for the various analyses, methodologies and aspirations proceeding under the ‘new materialist’ banner.  However, for the moment I want to draw attention to perhaps the most salient feature of new materialist thought: the agential character of matter.  Contra the conception of matter as inert, passive, featureless stuff – the legacy of Cartesian dualism and Newtonian mechanism – new materialists propose a non-reductive account of matter as that which possesses agency and productive forces of its own.​[10]​  Matter is thus considered to be lively and dynamic, the font of emerging forms.  Such a non-reductive materialism not only confounds dualistic accounts of form and matter, mind and body, organism and machine, it is also, for the most part, posthumanist and post-theological in orientation, for it refuses to restrict creative agency to persons alone, whether human or divine.

I believe that recent accounts of matter as that which is efficacious and self-organising are important interventions in theory because they seek to do justice to matter and materiality.  Moreover, a non-reductive formulation of matter is particularly pertinent for feminist theory since it resists hylomorphism and its gendered associations, namely, the socio-cultural connection made between the female and passive, indeterminate matter in contradistinction to the active, male form that gives shape to matter.  

Nonetheless, while I welcome the re-conception of matter by new materialists, it is my view that the tight focus on the liveliness and vitality of matter must be careful not to neglect the correlate of agency: namely, patiency.  Whereas the term ‘agency’ denotes the capacity for action or doings, and implies positive notions such as autonomy and independence, the term ‘patiency’, by contrast, denotes that which is acted upon (by others) or that which simply endures (through actions and events), and thus carries negative connotations such as passivity and dependence.  The trouble is that the valorization of matter’s agential qualities risks uncritically anthropomorphizing nature (understood here as the material world), inasmuch as it comes to mirror the humanist model of personhood, with its agential understanding of persons.​[11]​  Thus, rather than arriving at a post-human ontology,​[12]​ new materialists may be charged with simply extending the paradigm of the human person to the whole of nature, a move which preserves, rather than defeats, humanism.  Furthermore, by prioritizing activity (agency) over passivity (patiency), new materialism inadvertently sustains a dualistic interpretation of the active/ passive distinction, a dualism which is traditionally cashed out according to gendered stereotypes: while man is linked with vibrant, creative productivity, woman is aligned with less favoured qualities such as passivity, reproduction and inertia.  The radical promise of new materialism for feminist theory is thereby betrayed.

In her essay ‘On Not Becoming Man: The Materialist Politics of Unactualized Potential’, which appeared in the 2008 volume Material Feminisms, Claire Colebrook sees the appeal to vitalism by a number of (new) materialist feminists as something of a double-edged sword.  On the one hand vitalism offers feminists a way to oppose the Cartesian view of matter as lifeless, mathematizable res extensa, a view that would go on to pave the way for Newtonian mechanics.  On the other hand, the vitalist tradition poses difficulties for feminist thinkers to the extent that it affirms ‘an expressive and creative life force’,​[13]​ which is understood in opposition to the dumbness and passivity of inorganic, mechanical nature.  In a similar vein to my comments above, Colebrook warns feminists that a simple appropriation of traditional vitalism can only reinforce time-worn gender binaries concerning the active male and the passive female.  Seeking to circumvent this bind, Colebrook offers an innovative reading of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari as advancing a ‘new vitalism’, which she will also describe as a ‘passive vitalism’.  Whilst traditional, active vitalism posits life as the ultimate organising principle by which matter can be directed towards some particular end, Colebrook maintains that the striking move of passive vitalism is that it admits of ‘a matter that fails to come to life’,​[14]​ that is, matter conceived and acclaimed precisely insofar as it is unactualized potentiality, unproductive, virtual.  

This paper enters into conversation with Colebrook, taking seriously both her criticisms of the ventures with vitalism by feminist new materialists and the passive vitalism she elaborates as an alternative response to the ‘linguisticism’ which dominated poststructuralist feminist theory for much of the 1980s and 1990s.  However, I will argue that theology also offers a way to counterbalance an over-emphasis on the agency of matter by new materialists.  While I will suggest that a theological materialism need not regard matter as ceaselessly productive, I will also claim that matter’s moments of passivity need not point to a life perpetually at odds with itself (as Colebrook’s passive vitalism implies), but instead to a certain patiency of matter indicative of its ‘coming to be’ as distinct from its ‘becoming’.​[15]​  It is with this notion of ‘coming to be’ that a passage between theology and (a non-reductive) materialism may be charted.  





In western philosophy, it is the capacity for agency that traditionally serves to mark human persons as distinct from the rest of nature.  Richard Taylor puts it thus: ‘Persons are unique, in that they sometimes act.  Other things are merely passive, undergoing such changes as are imparted to them, but never really performing even simple actions as people do’.​[17]​  While the meaning of the word ‘agency’ may seem fairly straightforward, on closer scrutiny this is far from the case.  The term is operative in a range of contexts including metaphysics, ethics, and political theory.  Yet for all its fuzziness, the concept of agency is typically considered to encompass notions of selfhood, rationality, choice, intention, will, autonomy and independence, all of which effectively serve to delimit its application to persons alone.  

It is precisely the idea that personhood is a condition of agency that new materialists wish to deny.  If a more distributive​[18]​ understanding of agency is to be achieved, thus enabling the acknowledgement of matter’s agential power, then the tie between agency and agent, doing and doer must be undone at the ontological level.  With Nietzsche, new materialists hold that ontologically ‘there is no ‘being’ behind doing, acting, becoming’.​[19]​  The siren song of language must be resisted; the traps of grammatical structure avoided, if matter is to be envisaged as lively and vibrant rather than an inert substance capable only of mechanical motion.  

Diana Coole and Samantha Frost contend that a non-reductive materialism is marked by a materiality that ‘is always something more than “mere” matter: an excess, force, vitality, relationality, or difference that renders matter active, self-creative, productive, unpredictable’.​[20]​  The danger here though is that the articulation of a non-reductive materialism retains the standard view that matter must be supplemented by something other than itself, which serves to vitalize it.  For without such a supplement, matter continues to be ‘“mere” matter’: passive, dead stuff devoid of all quality (save extension and motion on the Cartesian-Newtonian model).  

Accordingly, Jane Bennett warns new materialists against repeating the mistake of nineteenth-century vitalists who, wrestling against the dominant mechanistic model of nature, refer to ‘a vital principle that while profoundly implicated in matter, is not “of” matter’.​[21]​   In order to avoid imagining agency as some sort of immaterial force indissociable from matter, while nevertheless distinct from it, agency itself must be materialized.  For new materialists like Bennett and Karen Barad, ‘Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfiguring of the world’.​[22]​  Importantly, then, rethinking agency demands an ontological shift, one congruent with a materialist, posthumanist understanding of agency.  In what follows I will delineate several significant aspects of the ontological topography envisaged by new materialist thought.

First, is a commitment to a metaphysics of process.  Drawing on a range of thinkers – including naturalists such as Democritus, Epicurus, Spinoza, Darwin and Niels Bohr, vitalists such as Bergson and Deleuze, the phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, historical materialists inspired by Marx,​[23]​ and feminist philosophers such as Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler and Donna Haraway – new materialists jettison a substantialist ontology and instead posit a world of creative becoming.  Such a world is at bottom characterized by myriad and complex processes of materialization.  Consequently, objects (whether things, structures or thinking subjects) do not pre-exist the various processes they subsequently undergo.  Rather they emerge from creative processes that yield, not sharply individuated entities with a fixed set of properties, but differential zones which, though determinable, are never completely determinate.  

To reiterate, for new materialists reality just is emerging materiality.  As Barad puts it, ‘The world is an ongoing open process of mattering through which “mattering” itself acquires meaning and form in the realization of different agential possibilities’.​[24]​  Such a vision resonates somewhat with the ancient Greek understanding of nature (phusis) as creative becoming.  Importantly, the avowal of nature’s capacity for self-formation must not overlook the materiality of this process.  Commenting on Heidegger’s understanding of being as phusis, Irigaray criticizes his phenomenological ontology for ultimately privileging form (morphē) and language over the potentiality of matter (hylē), and thus the reality of sexual difference.​[25]​  

In a similar manner, although in a different context, Barad argues that while Butler attempts to offer a non-reductive theory of matter – one which encompasses both the mediation of matter by discourse and the material reality necessarily implicated by such discourse – she, nevertheless, ends up perpetuating the idea of matter as the shadowy effect of (active, form-giving) signification.​[26]​  Certainly, Barad, like Butler, appreciates that at one level matter is the sedimentation of its ongoing discursive history.  However, wishing to resolve the problems she finds in Butler’s work, Barad also insists that the matter inherent in the activity of materialization is not to be figured negatively as the outer limits of discourse.  More positively, it is to be recognised as a productive power capable of modifying in non-trivial ways processes of materialization.  Barad suggests the term ‘entanglement’ as a metaphor for the relationship between matter and meaning, which are less like two distinct elements and more like differentiated phases of an open becoming.​[27]​  On this account, matter and meaning mutually engender each other.  Here we can note – and this is our second point – that new materialists emphasize a monistic ontology, thereby refusing dualistic oppositions between matter and meaning, matter and form, body and mind, etc, which have dominated the history of western thought.​[28]​

Third, by avowing a process ontology, new materialists also avow a relational ontology.  Thus, the ontological baseline is not discrete things but rather the network of relations in and through which varying agential sites (i.e. things) emerge.  Concerned that her rhetoric of ‘thing-power’ is problematic, insofar as it suggests that materiality is characterized by distinct, stable objects, Bennett’s vital materialism draws on the work of Spinoza and Deleuze and Guattari in order to emphasize the notion of assemblage.​[29]​  According to Bennett, the world is ‘a dynamic flow of matter-energy that tends to settle into various bodies, bodies that often join forces, make connections, form alliances’.​[30]​  The term assemblage captures the idea that bodies, that is, material objects, do not exist and act in isolation from each other but establish dynamic, protean groupings which constitute the rich, diverse ecologies that are the very condition of any particular thing.  Moreover, Bennett tells us, the word ‘assemblage’ does not refer to an organic whole governed by a predominant organizing principle but instead points to an unsystematic, yet more or less coherent, arrangement of interconnecting elements.  

While Bennett’s notion of assemblage may still carry undertones of individual things interrelating with each other (such that relations are predicated on things), Barad coins the term ‘intra-action’ precisely in order to convey the ontological primacy of relations and thus the derivative nature of things.  According to Barad, ‘reality is not composed of things-in-themselves or things-behind-phenomena, but of “things”-in-phenomena’,​[31]​ where phenomena are differing processes of materialization which produce various distinctions by virtue of specific intra-actions.​[32]​  Such intra-actions enact what Barad calls ‘agential cuts’ which institute fissurings and ruptures within the flow of phenomena (which would otherwise remain ontologically indeterminate), and so establish differentiations which introduce ‘exteriority-within-phenomena’,​[33]​ that is, boundaries separating ‘components’ in phenomena in ways that matter both ontologically, epistemologically and ethically.​[34]​  Importantly, Barad’s relational ontology (which she labels ‘agential realism’) ‘refuses the representationalist fixation on “words” and “things” and the problematic of their relationality’.​[35]​  Instead, it emphasizes the entanglement of matter and meaning in terms of agential intra-actions: processes of materialization in which notions such as ‘materiality’ and ‘discourse’, ‘subject’ and ‘object’, ‘human’ and ‘non-human’, emerge together as ‘entangled agencies’​[36]​ that articulate, not just human bodies and experiences, but an entire (more than human) world of differentiated becoming.

Barad’s focus on the idea of ‘intra-action’, rather than interaction, alerts us to a further aspect of new materialist ontologies: the reinterpretation of traditional notions of causality.  Where processes of materialization are characterized by the mutual constitution of emerging forms and distinctions, the expression of causal relations in terms of a linear series of efficient causes becomes wholly inadequate.  As Frost puts it, ‘to conceive of causation in singular, linear, and unidirectional terms is to elide the mutual and on-going transfigurations, the serendipitous, surprising, and sometimes anomalous developments that emerge through the kinds of interactions [or, indeed, intra-actions] highlighted by these new materialists’.​[37]​  

The relational ontologies advanced by new materialists are dis/organized by complex, multilayered causal processes which effect unpredictable ruptures, swerves, juxtapositions and groupings that resist analysis in the overly-simplified terms of mechanical chains of cause and effect.  Instead of efficient causation, William Connolly suggests the term ‘emergent causality’ as a more appropriate way to describe ‘the dicey process by which new entities and processes periodically surge into being’. ​[38]​  Connolly importantly points out that the concept of emergent causality challenges the traditional, strict division between human agency, on the one hand, and a world of objects set in motion by external causes, on the other.​[39]​  Emergent causality places the accent on the agentiality of material processes where no simple line can be drawn between cause and agent, or even between cause and effect.  Thus, Connolly writes: ‘Emergent causality consists of resonances within and between force-fields [read: different levels of material processes] in a way that is causal but beyond the power to isolate and separate all elements in determinate ways.  An element of mystery or uncertainty is attached to emergent causality’.​[40]​   Rethinking agency beyond the compass of human affairs demands a radical re-interpretation of causality in ways that are attentive to the self-transformative, capricious trajectories of lively matter.

The fifth point I wish to highlight regarding new materialist ontologies is the emphasis on immanence rather than transcendence.  Connolly explains: 

By immanence I mean a philosophy of becoming in which the universe is not dependent on a higher power.  It is reducible neither to mechanistic materialism, dualism, theo-teleology, nor the absent God of minimal theology.  It concurs with the...[view] that there is more to reality than actuality.  But that “more” is not given by a robust or minimal God.​[41]​

The transcendent God of classical theism has traditionally been figured as the archetypal agent.   On this account, the world is held to be the product of God’s creative act.  Moreover, not only is God’s creative agency believed to sustain the existence of whatever is, it is also said that God is providential, directing all nature to the fulfilment of the divine telos.  Divine agency provides the model for human agency.  Unsurprisingly, then, new materialists generally reject the idea of divine transcendence.  By liberating material immanence from the regimes of both divine and human sovereignty, new materialists can envisage matter as agential, and thus a world characterized by dynamic moments of creative transitions.  

Although new materialists such as Connolly repudiate the idea of divine transcendence, they do not, however, endorse an uncritical positivism that would insist on a strict adherence to the actual.  While material immanence (actuality) is all there is, for the new materialist, this is not a closed, mechanistic totality devoid of all novelty.  Instead, it is an ever shifting plane of creative materializations open to the spontaneous emergence of new formations.  It is precisely due to the creative becoming of matter that new materialism may be viewed as, to use Rosi Braidotti’s words, an ‘enchanted materialism’.​[42]​

Passive Vitalism: Between Mechanism and Vitalism
According to Colebrook, the exalting of materiality as that which is inherently agential and dynamic would seem, on the face of it, to be a welcome move for feminism because it overturns the customary image of inert matter, and in doing so collapses the gender hierarchy that figures woman as passive body and man as active mind.  However, commenting on the frequent appeal to the vitalist tradition by feminists seeking to articulate a new materialism that would re-energize a feminist theory exhausted by an over-emphasis on discursive factors, Colebrook observes, ‘What we have not overturned, though, is a horror of the inert, the unproductive, and the radically different: that which cannot be comprehended, enlivened, rendered fertile or dynamic’.​[43]​  Against the current of those streams of contemporary feminism lauding material agency, Colebrook calls for a break with a ‘norm of life’​[44]​ that privileges action, creativity and productivity over that materiality which remains unactualized potential.  She argues,

The true politics of matter lies not in matter now occupying the position that was once attributed to God (and the man who is made in his image) – the position of a being that has no determination or limit other than its own coming into existence – but in a matter that fails to come to life.​[45]​


It is not that Colebrook disagrees with vitalist and feminist critiques of matter as mere res extensa.  More precisely, her target is the vitalist insistence that life must always be striving, always a potentiality (dunamis) on its way to actualizing a particular form (energeia).  This ought to be of concern for feminists, Colebrook believes, precisely because it maintains the gendered dualism that is active male/ passive female.  As noted previously, Colebrook discovers in Deleuze and Guattari’s co-authored work, as well as in Deleuze’s solo writings, an alternative, minor tradition of vitalism – a passive vitalism – which can be distinguished from the more dominant strand of active vitalism, a strand which, on Colebrook’s account, includes figures such as Karl Marx, Henri Bergson, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Butler.  How, then, does a passive vitalism escape a norm of life which demands creative activity of all things endowed with life?  Moreover, why might the concept ‘becoming-woman’ created by Deleuze and Guattari turn out to be, as Colebrook holds, ‘the anti-vitalist concept par excellence’​[46]​?   It is to these questions that I now turn.

In her book Deleuze and the Meaning of Life, Colebrook summarizes the distinction between two forms of vitalism – one active, the other passive – in the following way: 

Vitalism in its contemporary mode...works in two opposite directions.  The tradition that Deleuze and Guattari invoke is opposed to the organism as subject or substance that would govern differential relations: their concept of ‘life’ refers not to an ultimate principle of survival, self-maintenance and continuity but to a disrupting and destructive range of forces.  The other tradition of vitalism posits ‘life’ as a mystical and unifying principle.  It is this second vitalism of meaning and the organism that, despite first appearances, dominates today.  The turn to naturalism in philosophy, to bodies and affect in theory, to the embodied, emotional and extended mind in neuroscience: all of these manoeuvres begin the study of forces from the body and its world, and all understand ‘life’ in a traditionally vitalist sense as oriented towards survival, self-maintenance, equilibrium, homeostasis and autopoiesis.​[47]​

In contrast to the standard reading of Deleuze’s philosophy as fundamentally life-affirming, a eulogy to life as pure, creative becoming,​[48]​ Colebrook argues that while he agrees with active vitalism that determinate bodies, structures and meanings emerge from life, he also views life as that which can, perversely, refuse synthesizing processes of creation, refuse conscious meaning, continuity and expansion.  

Baldly put, Deleuze’s passive vitalism is that which affirms life without, however, instituting life as a normative value: life need not always live.  Moreover, and crucially, for Deleuze, life or vitality is not circumscribed by the organism.  For life exceeds the parameters of living, identifiable forms and so is not bound by principles of organization.  Passive vitalism is thus the avowal of inorganic life.  As Deleuze and Guattari put it in A Thousand Plateaus, ‘If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organized...the life in question is inorganic, germinal and intensive...everything that passes between organisms’.​[49]​

By focusing their attention on the notion of inorganic life, Deleuze and Guatarri are able to develop a passive vitalism that enables them to bypass the opposition between (traditional, active) vitalism and mechanism.  Although informed by a history reaching back as far as Aristotle, vitalism as a self-defined position arose at the turn of the twentieth century precisely in order to challenge the mechanistic approaches to the life sciences prevailing at the time.  While mechanism struggles to explain the emergence of complex wholes and their capacity for transformation, vitalism, in its traditional form, postulates a vital principle or life-force as that which organizes matter towards a specific form whilst remaining irreducible to the material processes it guides.  However, by situating itself in opposition to mechanism, traditional vitalism remains dedicated to a conception of life which takes the living organism as normative.  Life is thus understood to be characterized by the capacity for self-organization and growth, as well as purposive striving towards the realization of pre-determined forms.  But this organicist or holistic model of life fails to appreciate what Deleuze (in both his single authorship and in his work co-written with Guattari), would describe as a virtual field of pre-individual singularities or forces, an inorganic life that is passive because its dynamism is not the intentional, purposive action of well organized bodies but rather that of chance encounters, some of which produce various levels of organization (‘molar’ forms ) and some of which remain ‘molecular’, thus tending towards further variation rather than bounded wholes or identifiable systems.  

Unlike traditional, active vitalism, Colebrook explains, passive vitalism enables us ‘to consider forces of composition that differ from those of man and the productive organism’.​[50]​  There are two important upshots to this.  First, by invoking forces that exceed the limits of the organism, passive vitalism refuses the association of the inorganic with death: lifeless, unthinking mechanism.  Instead, the living – i.e. determinate forms of life – is traversed by an inorganic vitality, that ‘powerful, non-organic Life which grips the world’.​[51]​  The basis for opposing the living organism with mere mechanism (death), phusis with technē, is thereby dissolved, enabling Deleuze to develop a machinic materialism (more on which later).  

Second, passive vitalism is able to achieve a radical anti-humanism by thinking life beyond the image of the human.  It is true, as Colebrook notes, that the Marxist theory of dialectical materialism reveals a vitalist impulse insofar as it counters Hegel’s idealization of matter by recognizing the dynamism of material life: while human, social labour transforms nature in various ways over time, it is also the case that – and here is the dialectical move – bodily needs irreducible to labour inflect socio-economic history.  The trouble is that Marxism aspires to fully humanize matter, harmonizing our material conditionedness with creative, free human activity.​[52]​  Notably, Colebrook also argues that anti-dialectical forms of vitalism, inspired by Nietzsche and Bergson, remain anthropocentric even as they seek to affirm life in its pure, preconceptual immediacy, liberated from all theologico-humanist categories believed to subject life to stultifying, transcendent norms.  This is because their refusal to countenance inertia, barrenness, and the non-living, coupled with their efforts to return all technical systems – language, concepts, perceptions, the rational subject – back to their constitutive origins, namely, creative life, belies a subtle commitment to the quite theologico-humanist demand for life to be fecund and productive.​[53]​ 

In addition to eluding the opposition between (traditional) vitalism and mechanism, as well as denying humanism, passive vitalism, Colebrook tells us, offers a novel way in which to rethink matter as ‘positive difference’.​[54]​  In common with new materialism, Deleuze and Guattari advance a monistic ontology whereby matter is life itself, is ‘creative force and difference’,​[55]​ rather than an inert medium animated by life.  Indeed, matter is understood to be intensive by these two co-authors, which is to say that it is not characterized by basic elements extended in space but by dynamic movements of differentiation.  Importantly, difference is not to be understood here as the difference between two distinct things, which would be a negative difference (x is not y) premised on identity and negation.  Rather, difference is continuous variation or endless becoming, a continuum comprising infinite singular events or positive differences.  Moreover, for Deleuze and Guattari, the movements of intensive matter – inorganic life – are those of desire.  This is not the desire for something that is lacking but a positive conception of desire as that which produces connections or relations.  Importantly, as Deleuze explains, ‘there is no subject of desire, any more than there is an object’.​[56]​  Thus, desire produces desire: a continuous intensification of differings and connectings.  

At this point, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the ‘machine’ becomes relevant.​[57]​  For machines, they contend, just are connections.  However, while a mechanism is composed of parts contingently related to each other in ways that make possible a specific function, and an organism is composed of parts related together in an integral unity that is purposive and self-sustaining, a machine is composed of connections that are not subordinate to a specific function or an overarching unity.  Consequently, connections – that is, desiring-machines – always carry the potential for further connections which in turn could actualize forces of desire differently.​[58]​  A machinic materialism, then, alerts us to an immanent, processual reality from which actual bodies and spatio-temporal relations surface.  Recalling Spinoza’s natura naturans, this ‘plane of immanence’ is 

a plane of absolute immobility or absolute movement...traversed by nonformal elements of relative speed that enter into this or that individuated assemblage depending on their degrees of speed and slowness.  A plane of consistency peopled by anonymous matter, by infinite bits of impalpable matter entering into varying connections.​[59]​


Deleuze and Guattari co-authorship direct our attention to a subterranean reality of flows and intensities that is not a chaotic materiality awaiting organization by pre-determined, immaterial forms but a ‘body without organs’, an inorganic life that is at once machinic insofar as it produces connections that yield various assemblages (actual bodies).  While these often settle into stable and enduring forms they are, nevertheless, always open to molecular, indeterminate becomings given their immanent relation to an intensive, differential materiality.  The appeal of Deleuze and Guattari’s work for many contemporary theorists lies primarily in their articulation of a post-human ontology in which difference and creative becoming are prioritized, thus promising exciting new modes of living and experiencing life which refuse all normative identities. 

Colebrook’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari philosophy is fascinating precisely because she finds in their work a passive vitalism that resists (traditional conceptions of) life and productivity.  The passivity of passive vitalism is at least twofold.  First, it signals a vitality without a subject or an agent (or an object for that matter): there is no life ‘of this or that identifiable substance’,​[60]​ for life is no more, and indeed no less, than positive difference or continuous variation.  That relatively durable forms emerge is neither the result of a constitutive life-force or spirit working through matter nor entirely mechanistic processes but of myriad desiring processes, or what Deleuze and Guattari also call ‘passive syntheses’, always already immanent in all actual bodies.​[61]​  Intensive matter is dis/organized by unconscious and unintentional dynamics.  

Second, passive vitalism affirms indeterminate becomings, that is, differential forces (also referred to as ‘multiplicities’ or ‘singularities’) that are not directed towards the realization of recognizable forms but instead signal a range of potential relations and affects.  Such forces (of becoming-other) are contra life and immobilizing insofar as they diverge from the self-maintenance of organized forms.  Passive vitalism thus brings to the fore detached, unactualized and unlived potentials that constitute what we might think of as a ‘deterritorializing vitality’, a mode of life that tends towards a virtual, intensive materiality and thus towards the disorganization and disembodiment of the organism.  The radical insight of Deleuze and Guattari’s passive vitalism, Colebrook maintains, is that ‘Life does not strive to maintain and produce itself but is inflected and directed by powers from without’.​[62]​  Whereas new materialism promotes the reconception of matter as inherently lively and agential, Deleuze and Guattari write of ‘a viral power in [material] life that takes the form of a variability without self-reference, without meaning’,​[63]​ a power characterized by stasis and sterility, thoroughly in tension with the dynamics and productivity of the organism.

Seeking to qualify the commonly held view that Deleuze is the philosopher of becoming, Colebrook is keen to point out that he never asserts the becoming of life per se.  For Deleuze, as Colebrook makes clear, life is not a single generative power from which all becomings erupt.  This is because there is only ever ‘a life’, an indefinite yet particular becoming that is not, thereby, the becoming of life in general.​[64]​  This is important both metaphysically and politically.  It is the former because it rejects the view (often attributed to a certain reading of Bergson) that there is a pure becoming – life – that is all creativity and untrammelled flourishing that, inevitably, is frustrated and opposed by the creations it effects.  Deleuze insists that becoming is always localized, a unique immanent encounter between pre-individual singularities by which new bodily relations and affective powers are actualized.  Yet a life is always already a queer vitality since its creative impulse is bound up with ‘the unproductive, the sterile, the unengendered, the unconsumable’,​[65]​ namely, the body without organs.  

The emphasis on ‘a life’ is politically significant because it contests the vision of the human as that which aspires to a pure becoming, thus free to actualize any kind of existence whatsoever, a vision beloved of the liberal tradition.  Given such an aspiration, the political imperative must be the refusal of all normative images of humanity since these only ever serve to subjugate human beings.  On such an account, the human is, to use Colebrook’s words, ‘a sense of what might be, of potentiality or proper realization.  To be human is to be burdened with giving oneself a world, with forming oneself and deciding on one’s own being’.​[66]​  

Now, as a number of feminists have observed, the image of the human as unencumbered becoming is implicitly framed according to gendered values.  It is man who is the subject of pure becoming, of self-productive life, the subject who casts the feminine as that material otherness through which he can ultimately arrive at himself as creative self-determination, the giver of forms.  Woman, on the other hand, is (on Deleuze and Guattari’s view) ‘a becoming that is not a becoming of a subject prior to its relations, nor is it a becoming toward realization’.​[67]​   Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘becoming-woman’ thus gestures away from a humanist-masculinist macropolitics towards a micropolitics whereby life is not that which strives towards its fulfilment in man – who comes to recognize himself as self-determining life and, consequently, the very acme of life – but rather a flux of molecular processes prior to the rational subject and the organism, and thus prior to all act and agency.  It is because becoming-woman marks the first phase of deterritorialization, that is, the dissolution of stable, organized form epitomized by the ‘man-standard’,​[68]​ that Colebrook suggests that it can be considered as ‘the anti-vitalist concept par excellence’.​[69]​  Moreover, becoming-woman emphasizes an immanent materialism: its orientation is directed towards the plane of immanence, away from the plane of transcendence, namely, illusory images of a fixed, originary ground as the basis of all becomings.  

To sum up: Deleuze and Guattari’s passive vitalism, as reconstructed by Colebrook, shares with new materialism a refusal of reductive accounts of matter as mere extended stuff to be vivified by an immaterial life-force.  For Deleuze and Guattari, there is only life – multiple differentiations – expressed as matter (and mind).  However, the critical step taken by passive vitalism is that life is not envisaged as that which strives to actualize form, nor that which endeavours to increase its creative productivity.   Instead passive vitalism proposes the notion of an inorganic, machinic life, thereby liberating the concept of life from the bounds of the organism, as this serves to tie life to self-maintenance (against death) and productive relations.  The dynamism of inorganic life is passive because it is not sustained by the intentional agency of the organism.  Furthermore, inorganic life presupposes unactualized potentialities that remain inert, detached and unrelated to organized form.  Passive vitalism invites us to elaborate a non-reductive, immanent materialism, where life is not all glorious, creative becoming but that which also deflects from the living, tending towards disorganization, disconnection and sterility.  

Admitting life’s ‘stupidity’, its potential not to realize its productive powers, and appreciating that all living bodies presuppose a life which does not live (the body without organs), enables a feminist critique of the theological-humanist imperative that life must thrive and be generative.  Given passive vitalism, the passivity of the female body does not denote a materiality that easily and without resistance yields to the determinations of male form but rather matter as positive difference, indeterminate becomings without actualization or relation, thus deviating from life as creative, expansive production.  

Colebrook also maintains that passive vitalism would reconfigure the relationship between nature (phusis) and culture (techne).  Rather than understand culture as that which either breaks free of nature (social constructivism) or serves as nature’s most complex self-expression (naturphilosophie), culture could be conceived as that nonhuman life which resists life.  ‘Culture would not be an extension of nature’, Colebrook explains, ‘but, through its very materiality, that which acts demonically in opposition to nature’s potentiality’.​[70]​  Here culture denotes those images, habits, quantifications, involuntary thoughts, pre-individual encounters and purposeless perversions comprising a passive dynamic prior to the conscious agency of subjects.  In view of such a dynamic, ethics and politics would need to go beyond goal-directed activity, which presupposes the rational subject as agent, in order to take into account how varying molecular, desiring processes ceaselessly compose human bodies and social relations, which are consequently marked by unactualized potentialities and latent affects.  According to Colebrook, the political is not the realization of life, whether this realization is understood to tend towards a particular normative framework (for example, the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas) or away from all metaphysical gestures (Nietzsche and Bergson).  Rather, the political must encompass a micropolitics that appreciates ‘all the ways in which an inappropriable non-life traverses bodies from the beginning’.​[71]​  

Theology, Life and Matter

It is Colebrook’s view that theology is committed to life as norm: the transcendent, creator God is the pure act from which all life endlessly flows.  God is thus the ultimate agent.  By contrast, and on a certain interpretation of classical theism, the material world is held to be empty of all life, lacking any creativity of its own.  The transfer of divine agency to man, effected by secular humanism, does nothing to alter the impoverished status of matter, which remains no more than a passive medium for the imposition of (male) form.  As we have seen, new materialism disputes this picture.  However, I think Colebrook is right when she observes that the new materialist emphasis on the liveliness of matter simply repeats at the level of material reality the modern understanding of the human person as fundamentally agential.  That said, while I welcome her attempt to highlight matter’s passive dimension without, nevertheless, reducing this passivity to the simple reception of all-determining form, I wish to question her claim that theology is inevitably bound by the tenet that life must always be productive.   In what follows, I hope to offer some preliminary suggestions on how a theological materialism could deliver a non-reductive materialism that upholds both the active and the passive aspects of matter, without running into the difficulties that, I maintain, attend passive vitalism.

Interestingly, Colebrook suggests that once vitalism is reconfigured beyond the constraints of organicism, it can be described as a ‘hyper-vitalism’ as well as a passive vitalism.​[72]​  For inorganic life swarms and heaves at the borders of determinate forms; as Deleuze and Guattari write: ‘The body without organs is not a dead body but a living body all the more alive and teeming once it has blown apart the organism and its organization’.​[73]​  The notion of a hyper-vitalism is significant because, I would argue, it helps to reveal how the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari does not entirely distance itself from the vitalist longing for life to be productive and creative.  For sure, their elaboration of a passive vitalism highlights unactualized potentials that remain unrelated and deflected from production.  But this is precisely to lay bare the transcendental conditions of a truly creative life, where life is no longer figured as the creative becoming of some actual body but as a pure potential for creative differentiation.  

For Deleuze and Guattari the problem with the vitalist tradition is not so much its stress on creative becoming but its organicist conception of life.  However, a commitment to inorganic life produces a troubling tension with respect to the sorts of practical insights we can draw from this.  On the one hand, for Colebrook, passive vitalism calls for a micropolitics charged with the twin tasks of i) attending to the barely discernible, infinite, pre-personal desires constitutive of, as well as exceeding, all bodies; and ii) aiming ‘to maximise the circumstances for the proliferation and pulverisation of difference’.​[74]​  On the other hand, pushed to its extreme passive vitalism could support a sort of fatalism whereby humanity simply awaits its dissolution by the deterritorializing forces of inorganic life.  Indeed, a motto for a politics informed by passive vitalism might be ‘let the desert grow...’,​[75]​ let organic, living bodies slip away into the anonymous flow that is non-human, inorganic life.  

Of course, Deleuze and Guattari, in a rather Aristotelian manner, seek the middle ground: neither the stasis resulting from the hubristic insistence on viewing the world as it accords with human existence nor the death, destruction and chaos which would ensue by ‘wildly destratifying’.​[76]​  The problem is, as Anthony Paul Smith rightly notes, that Deleuze and Guattari’s thought appears to lack a mechanism, other than ‘vague suggestions of cautious experimentation’, by which human life can become further open to unactualized potentialities and deterritorializing desires without, however, annihilating itself in the process.​[77]​  Moreover, when a micropolitics such as Deleuze and Guattari’s is underpinned by an ontology that places the accent on fragmentation and dissolution it becomes all too easy to end up endorsing either a passive anticipation for the unpredictable, revolutionary dynamics of inorganic life at best, or violently accelerating the arrival of the posthuman world at worst. 

Colebrook’s elaboration of Deleuze and Guattari’s passive vitalism is important because it reveals how the construal of matter as inherently agential remains tied to humanist and masculinist assumptions.  But, I contend, while passive vitalism avows the inert and the sterile, it does this precisely in order to liberate a creative life more superior than that which is delivered by vitalist positions which treat the agent – whether God, the human or life in general – as originary.  Paradoxically, passive vitalism means that a truly creative life is to be achieved by resisting the imperative for life always to strive towards its self-maintenance and self-enhancement; yet this resistance must be careful not to incur the total destruction of that which lives, the organism.  It is not that the human is displaced by the posthuman but rather it is through the human that posthuman, inorganic life is freed in ways that open up the creative transformation of the human.  Indeed, despite the anti-humanist direction of passive vitalism, it strikes me that the human remains a central figure here, since it is the human that is best able to counter-actualize (that is, deterritorialize or disorganize) bodies through art and philosophy in ways that can (somehow) maintain a productive tension between destruction and creation.

In what follows I will make three points serving as no more than an overture for a theological materialism, the details of which I hope to develop elsewhere.​[78]​  The first point concerns the claim, held by new materialists among others, that theistic accounts of divine creation necessarily robs the world of all integrity and contingency, reducing material finitude, and even human subjectivity, to no more than the passive effect of God’s creative agency.  The problem with this sort of criticism is that it assumes a contrastive account of the relationship between divine transcendence and worldly immanence. ​[79]​  Consequently, divine agency is construed as that which inevitably competes with worldly agency: the affirmation of God’s supreme agency can only come at the expense of non-divine, creaturely agency, and vice versa.  However, if we adopt a non-contrastive understanding of divine transcendence it is no longer possible to view God as one competing agent among others; rather God’s agency is wholly unique and, thus, cannot be contrasted with the agencies of this world, or with the agency of the world itself.  Moreover, far from denying agency to creatures, God’s creative agency can be understood as the very source of the creature’s autonomy and efficacy.  As Kierkegaard once wrote, 

Omnipotence, which can handle the world so toughly and with such a heavy hand, can also make itself so light that what it has brought into existence receives independence. Only a wretched and worldly conception of the dialectic of power holds that it is greater and greater in proportion to its ability to compel and to make dependent... the art of power lies precisely in making another free... only omnipotence can truly succeed in this.​[80]​

Although Kierkegaard, in the above passage, wishes to show how the total dependence of all creatures on God’s sustaining love and power need not sacrifice human autonomy and productivity, there is no reason, as far as I can tell, why autonomy and productivity cannot similarly be extended to non-human life and, indeed, matter itself.  Both theology and philosophy need to take seriously, Katherine Tanner’s remark that ‘To exclude genuine created efficacy as a possible direct effect of God’s agency is to misunderstand... the nature of the transcendence implied by the supremacy, sovereignty and holiness of God’.​[81]​  Divine transcendence defies any simplistic contrast between God’s productive power and the productive power of nature.

My second point challenges Colebrook’s assertion that theology commands life to be always active and fecund.  It is undoubtedly the case that the God of classical theism is considered to be that eternal, inexhaustibly generative life from which all finite things proceed.  However, it is worth considering how negative theology complicates this picture.  For example, the German Dominican Meister Eckhart (c.1260 - c.1327) evocatively appeals to images of barren desert, empty wasteland and desolate wilderness in order to convey the secret, innermost ground of the divine.​[82]​  Indeed, for Eckhart, deeper than even the eternal life of the Trinity dwells the silent, inactive divine essence or Godhead.  The divine ground emphasized by Eckhart’s apophaticism is, I submit, not altogether dissimilar to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of inorganic life.  This is because both denote the pregnant emptiness of pure potentiality, a groundless ground, a radical indeterminacy that is unlike any living thing because it is the immanent condition of all that lives.​[83]​  Without wishing to labour the point, Eckhart’s mystical theology intimates a life beyond the living, a life irreducible to the terms of human agency and the organism more generally.

As mystics such as Eckhart show, the theistic God need not only be regarded in terms of dynamic, vibrant life.  Correspondingly, God’s creation need not only be viewed as that which perpetually strives to live and expand itself.  The work of William Desmond is pertinent here.  In his efforts to construct a ‘metaxological metaphysics’,​[84]​ he distinguishes between what he calls passio essendi and conatus essendi.​[85]​  The latter term refers to the ‘endeavour to be’ or the self-affirmation of living things, while the former refers to the ‘patience of being’, the reception of being and life.  While passio essendi and conatus essendi are always coupled together, there is, Desmond tells us, a certain priority to the passio for ‘we are given to be before we give ourselves to be’.​[86]​  Creation ex nihilo means that prior to any becoming, or process of self-determination, there is a coming to be by virtue of which we – that is, all of creation – receive the gift of our ‘being-between’ (between being and becoming) from God, ‘an enigmatic endowing source’.​[87]​  Importantly, Desmond’s ontological vision emphasizes the idea that ‘[t]he passion of life is not originally of our willing’.​[88]​  

For Desmond, both modern and postmodern thought tends to focus exclusively on conatus essendi, thus subduing the passio essendi to the point that ‘self-becoming [life] circles around itself in an entirely immanent enclosure’ and, consequently, ‘there is no opening of the porous between [i.e. life] to an endowing source of life beyond all enclosed immanence’.​[89]​  By drawing attention to the coming to be of matter (and life more broadly), as well as its capacity for self-becoming, a theological materialism informed by Desmond’s metaxological metaphysics can, I venture, retain both the new materialist re-visioning of matter as lively and self-determining and the passive vitalist insight that an unchecked desire for matter to be productive and creative betrays a tacit humanism that would shape the world in an all too human image.  

Of course, whereas passive vitalism insists on absolute immanence, a theological materialism recovers a transcendent creator God to philosophy.​[90]​  Desmond contends that theism posits a ‘superior’ transcendence, namely, the absolute otherness of the divine.  Divine transcendence is a superior transcendence, Desmond explains, because it is an original otherness prior to an ‘exterior’ transcendence (i.e. the transcendence of finite beings external and irreducible to human thought and action) and to an ‘interior’ transcendence (i.e. the transcendence of human self-othering or creative becoming).​[91]​  Another way of putting this is to say that divine transcendence is ‘transcendence itself: an otherness reserved for God alone, and more than all holistic immanence’.​[92]​  When we conceive God’s otherness to be beyond the immanent whole, we can then think divine creation not in terms of the self-othering of the divine but as ‘the coming to be of finite being’,​[93]​ where finitude ‘is not its own determination, but is a released happening that is given its own promise of being creative’.​[94]​  On this account, the patiency of matter does not refer to a dynamism at odds with the organism but to the sheer ‘that it is’ of material finitude, which Desmond calls the ‘idiocy of being’.​[95]​  Moreover, the patiency of matter can stun our thinking such that it can become porous to that which exceeds finite determination, namely, that original, enabling power by which finitude is given to be.​[96]​  

Deleuze and Guattari’s immanentism reject the idea of an excess or reserve beyond the immanent whole – for the virtual and the actual rise and fall together, despite the arguable superiority of the former.  While the circle of immanence envisaged by Deleuze and Guattari is that of an open, rather than closed, whole, such that difference is never reduced to identity (à la Hegel), I would argue that the dynamism of this whole is inevitably agonistic.  Actual, finite determinations can only oppose and frustrate the a-teleological movements of inorganic life, which pull and push against the fixed boundaries of the organism, rendering these insecure.  There is no space for the affirmation of differences in their lived, concrete actuality.  The virtual power to differ – that life beyond (organic) life – configures the immanent whole towards creative dis/organization, always at the expense of the organism.  

The American theologian David Bentley Hart summarizes my reservations well when he writes, ‘Deleuzian affirmation is always an affirmation of the whole as force, never as gift or charity: not solely because a gift presumes a giver, but because being is intrinsically a violence whose intervals are not spaces where charity may be effectively enacted, but merely the shared ruptures between differences’.​[97]​  By contrast, the divine transcendence of theism is an otherness other than the circle of immanence and as such, I hold, is able to grant each thing its space to be and become for its own sake (rather than as a medium expressing a virtual creative power).​[98]​

The final point I wish to make concerns the implications for feminism given a theological materialism.  Colebrook, as we have seen, maintains that the passive vitalist concept ‘becoming-woman’ can reinvigorate feminism in radically materialist directions.  However, Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-woman is a concept which famously divides opinion among feminist theorists.  For Colebrook, it serves to ‘queer’ majoritorian politics of recognition, identity and representation by rethinking ‘woman’, not as something which is and which demands recognition, but as signalling positive potentialities (pre-personal desires) that ‘exceed and infinitely divide each body’.​[99]​  A mircopolitics attuned to such positive potentialities offers the prospect of a ‘higher deterritorialization’,​[100]​ open-ended, inhuman becomings which refuse any predetermined orientation.  

Yet feminists such as Gillian Howie view the concept ‘becoming-woman’ with suspicion.​[101]​  The problem, Howie maintains, is not only that it advances a theory of difference with no room for concrete (molar) sexual difference but that it achieves its seeming liberation from sexual dimorphism in a way that quietly recovers sexual difference through the back door.​[102]​  When Deleuze and Guattari identify becoming-woman with the schizo-processes of the body without organs, or with the inert, unproductive matter that is inorganic life, they continue to exploit, even if unwittingly, prevailing sexual difference stereotypes.  Moreover, Howie argues, the process of abstraction by which the virtual body is approached and reconfigured could all too easily be described as a process of disembodiment, and thus a process ‘arguably at odds with any productive and beneficial social critique of invested desire’.​[103]​  While abstraction for Deleuze and Guattari is supposed to be a material practice – namely, the heightening of sensitivity to the not yet lived, positive potentialities constitutive of all molar forms – the shift away from actual bodies is quite at odds with feminist phenomenology, which seeks to consider women’s experiences as these are lived and felt by embodied (inter)subjects situated in variable socio-historical contexts.

Theological materialism, I have begun to suggest, avows finite, lived actualities as those things which have been given to be and become.  The transcendent God of theism does not simply affirm difference per se but actual things in their sensuous particularity.  Leaving aside here the indefatigable debates concerning essentialism in feminist thought, it seems likely that ‘being a woman’ is basic to my sensuous particularity.  While highlighting the indeterminate powers and becomings composing and exceeding the human can remind us of how each thing always already contains the potential for creative renewal, this need not cast the lived body as a mere conduit for the erratic flux and flow of inorganic life.  For Deleuze and Guattari, the specificities of the lived body are ultimately irrelevant; it is only the body’s potential for becoming-other that matters.  Theological materialism attempts to hold together the coming to be of things and their potential for becoming.  Passio essendi, the patience of being, calls us to appreciate the existence of things in their sensuous particularity, for God wishes just those things to be, which means they are not simply for us.​[104]​  





This paper has wanted to sound a note of caution in response to the keen emphasis on the agency of matter by new materialists.  To be sure, rethinking the concept of agency, such that it may be said of matter, is a welcome step insofar as it acknowledges matter’s form-giving powers, its capacity to be self-determining as well as determined, and so its moment of independence from human discursive practices.  That said, I think feminist scholars ought to take heed of Colebrook’s identification of a blind spot shadowing the feminist celebration of matter’s liveliness and creativity.  As we have seen, for Colebrook, the problem is that the agential conception of matter, particularly as it is informed by the vitalist tradition, simply extends the modern image of self-determining man to matter and leaves intact the norm of life, namely, that life should always be productive.  The truly revolutionary idea, Colebrook argues, is that of matter understood as immanent, unactualized potential, as that which fails to come to life.
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^77	  Anthony Paul Smith, ‘The Judgement of God and the Immeasurable: Political Theology and Organizations of Power’ 81.  
^78	  For further insight into the idea of a theological materialism see my book Immanent Transcendence: Reconfiguring Materialism in Continental Philosophy 151-250.
^79	  On contrastive accounts of divine transcendence see Katherine Tanner, God and Creation in Christian: Tyranny or Empowerment.  She rightly argues, God’s transcendence is ‘beyond relations of identity or simple contrast’, ibid 66.
^80	  Søren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2, Entry 1251.  I am grateful to Simon Podmore for pointing me to this passage.
^81	  Tanner, God and Creation in Christian 87.
^82	  See for example Sermon 60, in Meister Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart.
^83	  See Patrice Haynes, ‘Immanence, Transcendence and Thinking Life with Deleuze and Eckhart’. 
^84	  Central to Desmond’s work is the notion of the ‘between’ or ‘metaxu’ to use the Greek term.  See William Desmond, God and the Between 10, 3.
^85	  In particular, Desmond, God and the Between 248-249.
^86	  Desmond, God and the Between  21.
^87	  William Desmond, ‘On the Surface of Things’ 45. 
^88	  Ibid 43.
^89	  Ibid 45.
^90	  It is worth appreciating that the categories of absolute immanence and absolute transcendence invert into each other; they both invoke an irreducible otherness, a non-appropriable outside to every determination that is also the immanent condition of every determination.
^91	  William Desmond, Hegel’s God 3.
^92	  Ibid, 200, my italics.
^93	  Ibid, 128
^94	  Ibid, 36.
^95	  Desmond, God and the Between 11, italics removed.
^96	  Ibid, 11.
^97	  David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite 66.
^98	  Given Colebrook’s reconstruction of a passive vitalism, theological materialism still faces the question as to whether – with respect to worldly immanence, which God has given to be and become – every becoming presupposes a subject?  To recall, Colebrook resists articulating becoming in terms of the becoming of some actual body because this occludes the molecular desiring processes that precede all bodies and which afford immanent creative transformations.  This is a question I do not have space to address properly here.  Moreover, I have not yet arrived at a position on this matter that I am reasonably satisfied with.  However, minimally, it seems to me that a theological materialism would admit the idea of inherent tendencies and forms in nature; as Stephen Clark puts it, ‘All living creatures, like diamonds and snowflakes, exist because there are a limited (but very large) number of ways to be, to be beautiful, to declare God’s glory’.  Stephen Clark, Biology and Christian Ethics 14.  
^99	  Colebrook, ‘Queer Vitalism’ 87.
^100	  Colebrook, ‘On Not Becoming Man’ 78.
^101	  Gillian Howie, ‘Becoming-Woman: A Flight Into Abstraction’.
^102	  Ibid, 85-86.
^103	  Ibid, 85.
^104	  Clark, Biology and Christian Ethics 284.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